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Arguments about the production of food are an important yet often
neglected feature of socialist literature. Britain is the country where the
agricultural revolution happened ﬁrst, and (with the exception of the
United States) went furthest. Perhaps for this reason English socialism
has often been caught between an enthusiasm for the egalitarian possi-
bilities of increased production on the one hand and nostalgia for simple
peasant agriculture on the other. This paper focuses on two antagonistic
models for socialist agriculture, the cottage economy and the collective
farm. The ﬁrst – associated with Romantic, individualistic, anarchistic
and medievalist forms of socialism – was the prominent way of imagin-
ing socialist agriculture in England during the nineteenth century. The
phrase originates in the title of William Cobbett’s Cottage Economy, ﬁrst
published in 1822, and Cobbett – with his mixture of radicalism and
conservatism – embodies many of the characteristics and contradictions
of the later tradition, which sought in various ways to create a free,
landowning peasantry. On the continent there were signiﬁcant parallels
in the anarchist thinking of Proudhon, Tolstoy and Kropotkin. The
cottage economy resonates later in diverse settings, from the dis-
tributism of G. K. Chesterton and Hilaire Belloc to the kibbutz move-
ment, from the agrarian policies of the Khmer Rouge to the fantasies of
celebrity chefs; the kitchen garden in Jamie Oliver’s Jamie at Home, or
Hugh Fearnley-Whittingstall’s River Cottage. For advocates of the
cottage economy, the emphasis is usually on the quality of the food and
the moral beneﬁts of growing it in this way, rather than the statistical
measurement of outputs that tends to preoccupy advocates of collective
farming.
The collective farm – associated with bureaucratic, utilitarian, statist
socialism and above all with the USSR – was largely a theoretical con-
struct until the advent of the Bolshevik revolution. In theory they were
owned by the people, and in practice administered by the state. In
contrast to the reversion to primitive techniques recommended by
Cobbett, William Morris and Edward Carpenter, advocates of collective
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farming gloried in new technology, tractors and efﬁciency, and instead
of small plots, collective farms were to be vast. Industrialised farming
techniques would increase yields and reduce labour time. For the Bol-
sheviks it was the heroes of American capitalism, Taylor and Ford, who
held ‘the key to a bright and prosperous future’.1 This applied as much
to agriculture as to industry. The rhetorical justiﬁcation for collective
farming usually emphasised the quantity of food (commonly imagined
as ‘grain’) produced, rather than its quality.
Even this schematic sketch is revealing of the internal dynamics of the
socialist movement. Perry Anderson has argued that the history of
socialism can be seen as a conﬂict between the aesthetic, Romantic
socialism of William Morris and the ‘crassly neo-Benthamite utopia of
mechanized industrial regimentation’ of Edward Bellamy’s Looking
Backward.2 Anna Vaninskaya makes a similar distinction, linking George
Orwell to Morris as part of a Romantic socialist tradition that ‘opposes
a utopian vision of decentralized democratic community to the evils of
rationalist utilitarianism, bureaucracy, and industrial regimentation’.3
There is a parallel here to the way in which the (Romantic) cottage
economy was opposed to the (utilitarian) collective farm. This essay
analyses attitudes to food and farming amongst British writers in the
inter-war period, looking at the ways in which experiments with collec-
tive farming in the USSR were reported and discussed. My hypothesis is
that this was a period in which the collective farm replaced the cottage
economy as the centre of gravity for socialist thinking about agriculture
and the land. This shift in socialist attitudes to food – from grow-your-
own to state provision – relates to a wider shift in the English political
imagination, from the Romantic strains of Morris to the more utilitarian
ideas of Soviet-style communism and Keynesian social democracy.
Those, like Chesterton, Belloc and Orwell, who retained an attachment
to the cottage economy were seen (at the very least) as standing outside
the mainstream of the socialist tradition, if they weren’t dismissed as
cranks. The organic movement – and celebrity chefs such as Hugh
Fearnley-Whittingstall – are their descendants.
*
William Cobbett’s Cottage Economy was a manual of practical advice for
labourers, showing them how to produce their own food and also stress-
ing the practical and moral beneﬁts of the cottage economy:
from a very small piece of ground, a large part of the food of a consider-
able family may be raised, the very act of raising it will be the best possible
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foundation of education of the children of the labourer; [. . .] it will teach
them a great number of useful things [. . .] and give them the best chance
of leading happy lives.4
Advice to labourers on how to keep bees is not in itself an overtly
political programme, but Cottage Economy undoubtedly sees small-scale
farming as producing social (as well as edible) goods. Viewed in the
context of Cobbett’s wider critique of industrialism, it can be seen to
form part of a recognisably radical tradition. Cobbett aimed to create (or,
as he saw it, restore) a class of free peasant proprietors capable of feeding
themselves. The question of who controls the food supply is thus inti-
mately tied up with the question of who owns the land.
The advocacy of peasant smallholding was also a prevalent feature
of anarchist thought in the nineteenth century. The ‘ideal of a free
peasant life was . . . a shaping element in Proudhon’s social and politi-
cal thought’, for example.5 Popular understanding of Proudhon often
starts and ends with the phrase ‘property is theft’, but this claim
becomes meaningless when it is taken in isolation from the fundamen-
tal theoretical distinction Proudhon makes between ‘property’ on the
one hand – a wholly artiﬁcial right and ‘the origin of evil on earth’6 –
and ‘possession’ on the other, the rightful occupation of a piece of land
by a tenant farmer, legitimated through labour.7 Possession, for Proud-
hon, is a natural right deriving from labour that is systematically
denied to the labouring class under the capitalist mode of production.
He explains:
As a labourer I have a right to the possession of the products of nature and
my own industry, but as a proletarian I enjoy none of them.8
This assertion of the labourer’s natural right to possession over and
above the proprietor’s merely legal right of property is a key moment in
nineteenth-century social thought. Laura Brace has shown that this
argument has a longer heritage. John Locke argues in Two Treatises of
Government that:
As much Land as a Man Tills, Plants, Improves, Cultivates, and can use the
product of, so much is his Property.9
Where in Locke this forms the basis of a defence of the enclosures (and
therefore the erosion of common land), in Proudhon it becomes a means
to assert the right of the agricultural labourer against the propertied
class. In a short period – coinciding with the industrial revolution – the
philosophical understanding of labour shifted fundamentally. The idea
that the land a man tills is his own went from being the philosophical
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basis on which bourgeois property was founded to the starting point of
a radical critique of bourgeois property. It had, via Proudhon, a huge
impact on the socialist tradition, and its importance for Marxism in
particular is often overlooked.10
This theory of property was important to advocates of the cottage
economy ideal, though not all Romantic socialists saw it this way: the
categories are not wholly coincident. Morris undoubtedly ﬁts into the
category of Romantic socialism, for example, but for all his admiration
for simple peasant life he did not campaign for the rehabilitation of
smallholding, arguing instead that both the factory system and the land
should be nationalised.11 Even so, Morris did not advocate the complete
abolition of private possession: he states that socialists ‘do not want to
share up all wealth: they want all persons to enjoy what they have fairly
earned by their labour and what they can fairly use’.12 There was some-
times a tension between calls for collectivisation and for smallholdings,
then, but the two were not always seen as incompatible. Edward
Carpenter argued that:
There are two main directions in which to go in the matter of secure
tenure. One is the creation of small freeholds; the other is the throwing
of lands into the hands of public authorities, and the creation of perma-
nent tenures under them. Though the latter embodies the best general
principle, I do not think that forms a reason for ruling out freeholds
altogether.13
He proposed a plan involving the creation of many more small free-
holds as well as the restitution of the ten million acres of common
lands that passed into the hands of landlords as a result of the enclo-
sures.14 Carpenter advocates a ‘principle of variety’ when it comes to
land tenure, insisting on the necessity of ‘creating not only State and
municipal ownership, but ownership by county councils, district coun-
cils, parish councils, etc. – with a leaning perhaps towards the more
local authorities, because the needs of particular lands and the folk
occupying them are likely on the whole to be better understood and
allowed for in the locality than from a distance’.15
Robert Blatchford, whose book Merrie England was central to English
socialism in the 1890s, was more deﬁnitely arguing for a return to an
imagined medieval way of life. He argued that the ‘factory system’
should be got rid of, and that – contrary to free-trade propaganda – ‘the
people who depend on foreigners for their food are at the mercy of any
ambitious statesman who chooses to make war upon them’.16 Blatchford
made a case for agricultural self-sufﬁciency, and – drawing on Kropot-
kin’s anarchist vision of a society of peasant smallholders, The Conquest
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of Bread – he argued for more efﬁcient, intensive use of the land, which
was to be farmed on small plots.
*
The effect of the Russian Revolution on English socialism was profound.
Soviet agricultural policy – which tended towards ‘large-scale, mecha-
nized agricultural unit[s] producing for the state in the same way
as large commercial farms produced for the market in a capitalist
system’ – altered the terms of the British debate.17
Questions of land and tenure were highly important in Russia in the
run-up to the 1917 revolution. The land reforms of Petr Arkadevich
Stolypin, prime minister of Russia from 1906 until his assassination in
1911, set out to do away with the vestiges of feudalism – serfdom had
been abolished as recently as 1861 – by creating a ‘new class of conserva-
tive peasant landowners’.18 Stolypin’s liberal reform enabled peasants to
break away from the medieval mir (peasant commune), which had tra-
ditionally held the land in common and divided it up amongst the
villagers, and instead establish themselves as small landowners in their
own right. G. K. Chesterton (one of the foremost British promoters of the
cottage economy ideal after 1917) admired Stolypin’s ‘policy of peasant
proprietorship’ as much as he excoriated Bolshevik collectivism.19 But
the ﬁrst move for the revolutionary authorities in 1917 was to put off a
confrontation with the peasantry by allowing them to seize lands from
expropriated landlords, which usually meant a return to the mir.20
Though the Russian intelligentsia had idealised the peasantry in the
1870s, the Russian Marxism that emerged as a distinct force in the 1880s
was anti-peasant in orientation. Russian Marxism was – in contrast to
English Marxism – ‘an ideology of modernization as well as an ideology
of revolution’.21 As a rule, English Marxism (from William Morris to
E. P. Thompson) tended to be sceptical of modernisation – i.e. capitalist
progress – often seeking to restore the best elements of the pre-capitalist
past.
Russian peasants were rarely idealised by English commentators as
inhabitants of a version of ‘Merrie England’. H. G. Wells describes ‘an
entirely illiterate peasantry, grossly materialistic and politically indiffer-
ent’,22 and such complaints about the ‘backwardness’ of the Russian
peasantry chimed with Bolshevik propaganda.23 Beatrice and Sidney
Webb wrote that Russia suffered from ‘the least productive of all the
peasantries in Europe’, citing ‘climate’, ‘race’, ‘illiteracy’ and the nature
of the orthodox religion as possible explanations.24 ‘[T]he majority of
the Russian mujiks were, in 1900, still in the fourteenth century’, they
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complained – ironically, exactly the prelapsarian state that cottage econo-
mists wanted to get back to.25 John Maynard, one of the key British
commentators on Soviet agriculture (and not to be confused with
Keynes, mentioned below), argued that:
The Revolution in Russia [. . .] revealed the normal peasant as the grower
of the family food and of the raw materials for the family clothing: and
willing to labour for a surplus, only in so far as he was compelled to
deliver it up in taxation, or induced to exchange it for vodka or for
manufactured commodities.26
Left to their own devices, the peasantry would simply divide the coun-
tryside up into a honeycomb of peasant smallholdings to be farmed on
a subsistence basis. There would be no food for the cities, and the
industrial proletariat would starve.
In the long run, the Bolshevik solution to this was collectivisation, but
Lenin was (initially, at least) chary about any attempt to collectivise the
peasantry by force.27 The New Economic Policy (NEP) that ran from
the end of the civil war in 1921 up to 1928 included concessions to the
peasantry and allowed some capitalist development in the country-
side.28 Nevertheless, grain requisitioning was commonplace as the
Soviet government extracted food from the peasantry in order to feed
the urban centres. Keynes, who visited the Soviet Union in 1925, noted
that the administration attempted to redress a perceived imbalance
between city and country through the control it exerted over the price of
food. By setting the price of grain and other foodstuffs well below the
world price (while forcing farmers to sell), and setting high prices for
industrial products, the authorities were able to ‘pamper’ the urban
proletariat at the expense of the peasantry.29
What role should the state play in managing, controlling or even
owning the food supply? This question was a live one in Britain in this
period, and reports on Soviet agriculture should be seen in the context of
this debate. Since the abolition of the Corn Laws in 1846 conventional
wisdom dictated that the best system, from the point of view of feeding
the poor, was free trade, because it ensured the availability of cheap
imported food.30 The Labour party itself was staunchly pro free trade
throughout the 1920s, and when it started to offer support for a more
interventionist state the example of Soviet Russia was a key element.31
But by then a deeper shift had already taken place. The Great War that
helped to precipitate and coincided with the Bolshevik revolution saw a
signiﬁcant expansion of the British state, as a percentage of GDP and in
terms of its executive powers, conscription being the most keenly felt.32
A state that had sent its young men to die in France was increasingly
seen as having a reciprocal responsibility towards its citizens: calls for
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state provision of healthcare, housing and unemployment beneﬁt were
starting to be heard.33 In terms of food, a new feeling that the state had
a vital role to play in managing and regulating its supply was an impor-
tant feature of the inter-war period. Free trade’s claim to be able to
alleviate poverty was based on the supply of cheap imported food, but
after the war the emphasis of the popular debate moved from the price
of food to its healthiness. Frank Trentmann writes:
Talk of ‘necessaries’, so vital to the public appeal of Free Trade in the
Victorian and Edwardian period, now moved away from a liberal defence
of markets and cheapness to a more social-democratic focus on public
health. To be a citizen meant to have access to ‘essential’ food, which states
should provide at fair prices. Cheapness, in other words, no longer pre-
vented malnutrition.34
Milk was a key commodity in this shift: governmental intervention
began with the Milk and Dairies Order in 1901, which established
minimum levels of butterfat and non-fat solids below which milk was
considered to be adulterated and unﬁt for sale. Legislation gathered
momentum after the Great War, in the context of a wave of infant
mortality caused by infected milk in hospitals, resulting in public pres-
sure for the state to regulate the supply.35 This was part of a movement
which tended to emphasise that ‘What mattered now was not so much
what food cost as what was in it’: the state had a new role to play in
ensuring the quality of food.36 The Milk Control Board was established in
1918, and ‘the state was on the point of taking over the entire wholesale
milk trade’.37 In Britain, the increased collectivisation of the food supply
was all about guaranteeing the quality of produce, and as such it drew on
native traditions of English socialism as much as it reminded many of
the Soviet experiment.
The Fabian Society had, in the Edwardian period, been preparing the
ground for the increased intervention of the state into questions of food.
Hubert Bland’s 1905 tract on the state feeding of school children argues
that ‘all children, destitute or not, should be fed, and fed without charge,
at the expense of the State or Municipality’.38 For Fabians, the regulation
of various foodstuffs would not be enough to guarantee their safety;
public ownership was what was required, and milk was again at the
heart of the debate. F. Lawson Dodd’s Fabian Tract Municipal Milk and
Public Health drew a comparison with the regulation and then nationali-
sation of the water supply: ‘mere external interference was insufﬁcient,
and hence a movement became general towards investing the owner-
ship as well as the control of the water supplies of the country in the
hands of the community’.39 Dodd’s proposals were explicitly opposed to
the free-trade orthodoxy which then had mass public support: ‘It is only
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necessary to convince the public that it can no longer afford to drink
dirty and expensive milk in order to support its adherence to a worn-out
and obsolete economic theory’.40 Hilaire Belloc – a key ally of Chester-
ton’s, a distributist and an advocate of the cottage economy – saw the
retail urban milk trade as the ‘typical illustration’ of ‘one of the stock
arguments of Communism’.
Your Fabian bewailed the state of affairs in which two small men, each
with the goodwill of a milk walk overlapped. He pointed out that the
expenses of distribution would be vastly reduced by one system control-
ling the whole mass of small milk walks as they existed not so long ago. He
has lived to see the thing come about, in this country at least; for the small
man in the milk trade has almost disappeared. A huge monopoly has
swallowed him up.41
Belloc was concerned to defend the small distributor, as much as the
small producer, against large monopolies. Whether monopolies were
owned by the state or by capitalists, for Belloc the effect was the same.
This perspective is integral to the cottage economy’s dual critique of
capitalism and collectivism. Belloc saw communism not just as some-
thing that is ‘over there’ in Russia, but as a real tendency within British
life and one, moreover, that ‘moves along the same lines as Capitalism’.42
*
In Russia at the end of the 1920s, the Bolsheviks felt caught between the
medieval backwardness of the ‘tradition-bound mir’ and the ‘peasant
capitalism’ – with its emphasis on smallholding – that had gathered pace
with the Stolypin reforms and under NEP.43 Stalin’s solution, as he
explained it in May 1928, was to ‘transfer from small, backward and
fragmented peasant farms to consolidated, big, public farms, provided
with machines, equipped with the data of science and capable of pro-
ducing the greatest quantity of grain for the market’.44 In reality, collec-
tivisation often involved more compromises with existing peasant
institutions and with the past than this implies – ironically peasants
often saw it as a second serfdom – but the regime represented collec-
tivisation in these uncompromisingly modernising terms and this is
how British observers tended to understand it.45
Communist ideas about the struggle in the countryside are reﬂected
in Sergei Eisenstein’s The General Line (1928), where intransigent pea-
sants resist the attempts of a leather-clad Bolshevist to modernise their
farming methods. One telling sequence sees a piece of open pasture fade
into an image of the same land divided by wooden fences into tiny plots.
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Sergei Eisenstein, The General Line (a.k.a. Old and New)
The fully mechanised collective farm wins out in the end, in a memo-
rable sequence in which tractors – the ultimate image of Soviet agricul-
ture – crash through the wooden fences, dispensing with the terrain of
the peasant smallholder and inaugurating the huge collective farm. The
ﬁlm was seen in Britain and reviewed by Bryher in Close Up: it may not
have matched up to Battleship Potemkin visually, she thought, but she had
‘no quarrel with the sociological import of the ﬁlm’, approving of its
‘vision of Russia covered with tractors’.46
Sergei Eisenstein, The General Line (a.k.a. Old and New)
Eisenstein’s ﬁlm was made at a transitional point in the history of
Soviet agriculture. The consensus under NEP was that peasants would
voluntarily collectivise themselves, but by 1928 only 1.2 per cent of the
total sown area of the USSR was taken up by collective farms (kolkhozy).
Kulaks – prosperous peasants who had beneﬁted from Stolypin and
from NEP – were increasingly blamed for hoarding, and in 1929 the free
market in grain was completely eliminated as Stalin announced ‘the
liquidation of the kulaks as a class’ and the party committed itself to a
policy of all-out forcible collectivisation.47 The agricultural revolution in
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England took centuries, but the expropriation of the peasant population
was its most painful effect, and one of the key elements of capitalism that
Cobbett and Marx responded to.48 The collectivisation of the Russian
countryside was like the enclosures all over again, compressed into a
brutal four years. This time, however, socialists were being asked to
cheer on the expropriation of ‘kulaks’ in the name of progress.
British discussions of the Soviet collectivisation drive suggest a sig-
niﬁcant shift in the attitudes of English socialists towards the state.
Postwar turmoil, compounded by the effects of the great depression, led
to a loss of faith in the market, and many turned to the state to take a
more active role in the production, distribution and regulation of the
food supply. The ideal of the free peasant proprietor – like those ‘kulaks’
who were being persecuted in Russia – no longer held a central place in
the socialist imagination.
In fact, those – like Hilaire Belloc and G. K. Chesterton – who clung on
to this ideal tended not to be classiﬁed as socialists. Chesterton was
happy to call himself a socialist in the 1890s, but not later on – yet it was
largely socialism that had changed, not his own political project. Ches-
terton admired William Morris but could not fathom why he might have
called himself a socialist. It was impossible to imagine that Morris
‘would have tolerated for ten seconds the vast industrial materialism of
the Five-Year Plan’.49 Instead, Chesterton started to see Mussolini’s
fascism as the best political means to achieve his objectives.50 A. J. Penty
followed a similar trajectory from disciple of Morris in the Edwardian
period, through guild socialism, and ﬁnally to the belief that the ‘Regu-
lative Guild State’ he desired had come into being in Mussolini’s Italy.51
Again, the constant was the belief in ‘a local life . . . rooted in local
traditions’, a revival of ‘the corporate life of the Middle Ages’.52 During
the years in which the USSR dominated debates about socialism, to
believe in the ‘cottage economy’ was generally to be seen as a fascist, a
Catholic or a crank.
Some in this group were quick to notice the authoritarian potential of
collective farming. The Communist government itself referred to the
grain requisitions of the civil war period as part of a ‘food dictatorship’.53
‘[F]ood is a weapon’ was Litvinov’s mantra during the famine of 1921, as
Harold Henry Fisher noted.54 The potential for the state control of the
food supply to be put to authoritarian uses was heavily linked to Soviet
Russia in the British debate. In 1932, Rev. Ronald Knox – a Catholic and
a Chestertonian advocate of a society of peasant smallholders – pub-
lished a mock-up of a hypothetical edition of The Times under the title
‘If the General Strike had Succeeded’ in a volume of counterfactual
history called If It Had Happened Otherwise. Knox’s contribution com-
prised various stories about and reﬂections on the establishment of a
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communist state in Britain, including two ﬁctional letters to the editor
about the ‘Milk Pool in Hyde Park’. The imagined communistic govern-
ment has developed a system of storing milk in a huge pool in Hyde
Park, to the extent where, as one aggrieved correspondent puts it,
‘several suburbs entirely depend on it for their daily supply’. This state-
owned milk supply is ‘a weapon’ with which the government ‘can
threaten, if its authority should at any time be deﬁed, to starve London
into obedience’.55 Knox’s fears over the nationalisation of the food supply
tapped into the public discourse around the Soviet state farms, and there
is an implicit link to the recent establishment of the Milk Board in Britain.
As a substance that plays a key role in binding an infant to its mother,
milk was a particularly evocative commodity. If the state was taking
control of the nation’s milk, was it in some ways stepping into the role of
the mother, and breaking up the institution of the family? In The Sleeper
Awakes (ﬁrst published in 1899 as When the Sleeper Wakes) H. G. Wells
depicts a dystopian future in which the nursing of children is controlled
by the ‘International Crèche Syndicate’. The wet nurses in this world are
robots,
a vista of mechanical ﬁgures, with arms, shoulders and breasts of asto-
nishingly realistic modelling, articulation, and texture, but mere brass
tripods below, and having in the place of features a ﬂat disc bearing
advertisements likely to be of interest to mothers.56
Huxley took up this theme in Brave New World, a novel deeply worried
about the expansion of the state’s functions. Here, all aspects of child
rearing have been collectivised. Mustapha Mond thinks back to the bad
old world, where
Maniacally, the mother brooded over her children (her children) . . .
brooded over them like a cat over its kittens; but a cat that could talk, a cat
that could say, ‘My baby, my baby,’ over and over again. ‘My baby, and oh,
oh, at my breast, the little hands, the hunger, and that unspeakable ago-
nizing pleasure! Till at last my baby sleeps, my baby sleeps with a bubble
of white milk at the corner of his mouth. My little baby sleeps . . .’
‘Yes,’ said Mustapha Mond, nodding his head, ‘you may well
shudder.’57
In Huxley’s dystopian future – and perhaps implicitly in Russia – milk
is administered by the state, and not by the mother: a disturbing indi-
cator of authoritarianism. Half a century later, Margaret Thatcher – who
accused the welfare state of breaking up families by usurping various
functions that properly belonged to parents – was referred to by social-
ists as ‘Maggie Thatcher Milk Snatcher’ when she abolished the provi-
sion of free milk in British schools.58 This demonstrates just how far the
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British left had moved from its Romantic agrarian roots. The state’s
interventionist role in administering food (and in child rearing) is seen
not as a dystopian nightmare, but as a de facto good.59
*
Other critiques of collective farming responded to actual conditions in
the Russian countryside. In the years 1932–4, one of the worst famines in
human history swept the USSR. Estimates as to the death toll vary, but
ﬁve million is probably roughly accurate.60 And yet, despite the appear-
ance of ﬁrst-hand reports by Malcolm Muggeridge and Gareth Jones in
the Manchester Guardian which prompted further coverage across the
print media, a signiﬁcant portion of the British intelligentsia ignored or
denied it.61
In Soviet Communism: A New Civilization, the Webbs attribute all talk
of a man-made famine to ‘persons hostile to the Soviet Union’.62 ‘What
the Soviet Government was faced with’, they wrote, ‘was, in fact, not a
famine but a widespread general strike of the peasantry, in resistance to
the policy of collectivization, fomented and encouraged by the disloyal
elements of the population’.63 Although off the mark, their analysis was
not a complete ﬁction: as Fitzpatrick puts it, ‘The famine of 1933 was the
consequence of an irresistible force (the state’s demand for set quotas of
grain) meeting an immovable object (the peasants’ stubborn passive
resistance to these demands)’.64 But this was not merely the resistance of
peasant smallholders who wanted to farm at subsistence levels. It was
the resistance of starving people who did not wish to relinquish what
little grain they had, often – as Muggeridge noted in the Manchester
Guardian – for it to be exported to Western Europe.65 In Winter inMoscow,
a harrowing novel about western journalists in Russia at the time of the
famine, Muggeridge describes the horrible story of a peasant family
whose last bag of ﬂour is requisitioned. The delirious mother kills her
children and puts their bodies in sacks, before surrendering them as
grain and killing the man sent to collect them.66 Muggeridge writes that
‘Bolshevism, like an enormous stomach, threw out digestive juices and
assimilated the affair’,67 and goes on to describe how these events are
reported in the Soviet press as ‘Symptomatic of new tactics of kulak
elements’.68
The Webbs argued that the Soviet government attempted ‘so
drastic . . . , so hazardous an experiment’ because ‘there was no other
course open to them’.69 But their endorsement of the collective farm is
unambiguous, and comes with a direct critique of smallholding. Here
they reﬂect on the task facing the Communist authorities:
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To convert, within less than a decade, even two thirds of a population of
120 millions of peasantry steeped in ignorance, suspicion and obstinacy,
accustomed for centuries to individual cultivation of the little holdings that
they now deemed their own, with all the cunning and greed that such
a system develops, into public-spirited cooperators working on a pre-
scribed plan for a common product to be equitably shared among them-
selves, might well have been deemed hopelessly impracticable.70
What is at stake here is not merely the ‘backwardness’ of the Russian
peasant, but the whole principle of peasant smallholding. The Webbs
collapse the distinction between peasant capitalism (along the lines
promoted by Stolypin and by NEP) and the attachment to the medieval
mir. Both are seen as versions of the cottage economy, which is indicted
as an encouragement to ‘cunning and greed’, and the collective farm is
promoted as the cure.71 The Fabian commitment to the principle of
collective ownership of agricultural land and of the food supply pre-
dated the Bolshevik revolution: perhaps the only way of holding onto
the ideal in the period of actually existing collective farming was to insist
that it was working, and blame any shortages on kulaks or peasant
backwardness.
Fabians defended the collective farm as it had been conceived in the
Edwardian period, but there were also socialists who criticised collec-
tivisation in the spirit of Merrie England and the cottage economy. For
George Orwell, for example, a defence of the small farmer and a hatred
of industrialised food (‘making sausages out of ﬁsh, and ﬁsh, no doubt,
out of something different’72) formed part of his desire to keep decency
alive in the face of industrial modernity. His treatment of the famine in
Animal Farm is understated by comparison with Muggeridge’s Winter in
Moscow, but it shows his hostility towards collective farming, not just
in practice but also in theory. Napoleon – the pig who represents Stalin
in the story – tries to conceal the food shortage: sheep are instructed to
remark within hearing of a human visitor that their rations have been
increased. Empty bins are ﬁlled with sand and topped with grain to give
the impression of abundance to neighbouring farmers.73 When the hens
are instructed to surrender their eggs, which are to be sold off the farm
at a time of famine, Napoleon says that they ‘should welcome this
sacriﬁce as their own special contribution towards the building of the
windmill’.74 But the hens protest by laying their eggs while perched high
on the rafters, causing them to fall and smash on the ﬂoor below. The
rebellious hens are later slaughtered.75
As well as targeting the brutal coercion that Stalin’s regime used in
what Muggeridge termed a ‘war between the government and the peas-
ants’,76 Orwell’s satirical presentation of these events raises questions
about whether the state has the right to control the food supply. The
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political philosophy of animalism, elaborated at the beginning of Animal
Farm by Old Major, complained that ‘nearly the whole produce of our
labour is stolen from us by human beings’.77 One could retort that this
is just the necessary character of agriculture in a partially urbanised
society: whether prices are set by a cartel of supermarkets or by the state,
the net effect is that farmers have to surrender a large proportion of their
produce, and (except for very large landowners who in any case do not
work the land themselves) they rarely end up rich. The central conten-
tion of Orwell’s satire is that the pigs take over from the humans – the
communist state exploits the peasantry in exactly the same way as capi-
talist landowners or the old tsarist autocracy did. Neither achieves the
implicit goal of allowing farmers to own their produce and eat it: ‘live of
your own’, as Belloc put it.78
The idea that the Soviet farm was a version of the large capitalist farm
had a certain currency in the period. The Economist noted that ‘The
present Sovhos [state farm] is a big mechanised estate run on commercial
lines similar to those on which big estates are conducted in the U.S.A.
and other capitalist countries’.79 For those like Muggeridge and Orwell
who were critical of collective farming from a socialist perspective, the
comparison of the state farm with capitalist agriculture was an important
rhetorical strategy. As Muggeridge wrote, the Bolsheviks’ ‘dreams and
plans were essentially urban; proletarian Big Business; Marx-Ford
Bourneville’.80 Collectivism was simply monopoly capitalism, with the
state taking the place of the capitalists at the top of the oligarchy, as
Chesterton and Belloc had been arguing since the Edwardian period. In
The Outline of Sanity Chesterton wrote that
when capital has come to be too much in the hands of the few, the right
thing is to restore it into the hands of the many. The Socialist would put it
in the hands of even fewer; but those people would be politicians, who (as
we know) always administer it in the interests of the many.81
Whom does Chesterton mean by ‘the few’? Well, there is almost
certainly an anti-Semitic subtext here. His point, though, is that
nobody, least of all politicians, could be trusted to administer the agri-
cultural land except the peasants themselves. There is little to differ-
entiate the functionary in charge of the kolkhoz from the capitalist
landowner.
Muggeridge took a similar view: ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat
decrees the abolition of property and thereby creates a situation in
which the most vile manifestation of the instinct to possess can have free
play’, he wrote.82 And Winston Smith encounters a similar argument in
Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, when he reads Emmanuel Goldstein’s
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Theory and Practice of Oligarchical Collectivism (a ﬁctional critique of the
authoritarian state the novel depicts). Goldstein writes:
It had long been realized that the only secure basis for oligarchy is collec-
tivism. Wealth and privilege are most easily defended when they are
possessed jointly. The so-called ‘abolition of private property’ which took
place in the middle years of the century meant, in effect, the concentration
of property in far fewer hands than before: but with this difference, that
the new owners were a group instead of a mass of individuals. Individu-
ally, no member of the Party owns anything, except petty personal belong-
ings. Collectively, the Party owns everything in Oceania, because it
controls everything, and disposes of the products as it thinks ﬁt. In the
years following the Revolution it was able to step into this commanding
position almost unopposed, because the whole process was represented as
an act of collectivization.83
Those who saw the dangers of collectivism from the left often wanted to
reassert a kind of connection with the soil that the collective farms had
destroyed. Muggeridge explained that Soviet agricultural policy was
‘inconceivable and horrible to anyone having even a remote connection
with earth, with the seasons, with the labour of sowing and the joy of
harvest; plausible enough in some stuffy café or committee room’.84
While Orwell was writing feverishly about Stalinism, he was also trying
patiently to establish himself as a Suffolk smallholder. His domestic
diaries record in detail the number of eggs his hens had laid, how many
pints of milk his goat Muriel had yielded, and when to plant his peas,
beans and potatoes. He seems also to have been a subscriber to the
Smallholder, a magazine to which he makes frequent reference.85
Important distinctions exist between the various thinkers for whom
the peasant smallholder became a bulwark against the Soviet collective
farm. Orwell was certainly critical, for example, of those popular advo-
cates of the cottage economy as a political project, who – like Chesterton
and Roland Knox (who wrote about the milk pool in Hyde Park, and
whom Orwell mocked) – were Catholics or fascists.86 Orwell’s criticisms
of Soviet collectivism share some important features with Chesterton’s,
but he wanted to defend a properly socialist version of the cottage
economy that was neither Catholic nor fascist.
There were also those on the British left who celebrated the Soviet
farms in their own terms: if they bore similarities to American capitalist
ranch farming, then so much the better – this was the most modern and
efﬁcient arrangement and would no doubt yield more ‘grain’. Joan
Beauchamp, for example, a suffragette and co-founder of the Commu-
nist Party of Great Britain, made the standard comparison with America
in her book Agriculture in Soviet Russia. Unlike Orwell and Muggeridge,
though, she did not see this as an indictment of collective farming. She
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noted approvingly that the director of the Verblud (a state farm) ‘spent a
year in Canada and the U.S.A. studying large-scale farming methods’.87
Moving on to the Gigant, ‘the largest farm in the world’ at 450,000 acres,
she praised the way it was ‘completely mechanised as far as the actual
cultivation is concerned’.88 She continued: ‘The director of Gigant told
me that he considered himself the richest man in the world, for “his”
farm is four times the size of the biggest farm in America.’89 What is
surprising is that a British socialist, traditionally so critical of Fordist
industrialism, could ﬁnd this appealing.
If Muggeridge and Orwell tapped into traditions of Romantic social-
ism that sought to enact a return to the land, there was also an emerging
debate within the realm of agricultural science that advanced technical
as well as moral reasons for advocating smallholdings. The organic
movement emerged partly as a way of perpetuating the idea of the
cottage economy in a period when most socialists had come to believe in
the necessity of the mechanised collective farm. At Faber and on the
editorial board of A. R. Orage’s New English Weekly, T. S. Eliot played an
important role in publishing key texts by early advocates of organic
farming such as G. T. Wrench, Anthony Howard and his wife Louise
Howard.90 Alexandra Harris has recently explored Eliot’s interest in
agriculture in the 1930s: as she points out, he wrote in the Criterion that
‘the greater part of the population, of all classes [. . .] should be settled in
the countryside and dependent on it’.91 Harris is quick to link Eliot’s
advocacy of the cottage economy ideal – via his correspondence with the
conservative agriculturalist Viscount Lymington – to ‘Hitler’s analogous
ﬁght for the pure soil of Germany’.92 Lymington undoubtedly shared the
cottage economy analysis of the Soviet Union:
In Russia the hammer has been discarded for the conveyor belt, and the
sickle for the combine harvester-thresher. The former are the symbols of
human effort against nature, the latter are the chains that enslave man to
the machine.93
But Eliot’s interest in agriculture also involved contact with agricultur-
alists like Louise Howard (née Matthaei), who were very much on the
left as well as advocating a return to the soil. Howard was pro Sparticist
in the twenties, worked on the International Review with Leonard Woolf,
and made strenuous efforts to help German refugees from Nazism.94
The wider context of the cottage economy discourse to which I have
drawn attention, moreover, helps to show that the demand to go ‘back to
the land’, while undoubtedly forming an important element of fascism,
is socialist and anarchist in origin. This is not a simple left/right issue.
The organic movement, which had strong links with the modernist
intelligentsia through the likes of Eliot, Louise Howard and Orage, was
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as much a rejection of Soviet agriculture as a critique of capitalist
farming. In Reconstruction By Way of the Soil – published by Eliot at
Faber – G. T. Wrench sees the mechanisation of farming in the USSR as
contributing to soil erosion. He viliﬁed the tractor, ‘the visible image of
the inner belief in the machine as a saviour’ and ‘heralded as a propa-
gandist’ for collective farming in the USSR.95 In this book Wrench advo-
cates ‘The restoration of the peasantries and peasant families as the
cardinal cultivators of the soil’.96 Wrench’s work, which was central to
the development of the organic movement, can tell us a lot about the
peculiar politics of its present-day acolytes, who have been destined to
be cut off from socialism ever since the ofﬁcial left plumped for Stalinist
collective farming in the 1930s.
*
Perhaps the most interesting British responses to the collective farm that
I have discovered are the following. Writing – perhaps crucially – after
the signing of the Anglo-Soviet Pact, Margaret Cole argued that Russia
beneﬁted from
a communal village association which preserved in Russian agricultural
life a tradition of collective responsibility which had been lost in England
since the last Labourers’ Revolt ended in the graves at Micheldever. This
tradition, passing through many vicissitudes, has proved the basis for the
collective farm and rural soviet organisation which is so strongly estab-
lished today.97
Cole is writing from a statist, pro-Soviet, Fabian perspective, but she also
manages to describe the kolkhoz as if it was a continuation of the medi-
eval peasant farming that had died in England at the time of the enclo-
sures. Here the Russian peasant was not imagined as holding back the
progress of socialism – on the contrary, his backwardness was to
be celebrated as the foundation for the socialist organisation of the
countryside.
This was a debate that had been an element of Russian socialism since
the nineteenth century. The Narodniks – the ‘People’s Party’, which was
an important anti-tsarist force in late nineteenth-century Russia – held
that the mir would form the basis for peasant socialism, and that the
capitalist phase of agricultural development could be skipped alto-
gether.98 Even Engels predicted in On Social Relations in Russia that ‘the
system of communal property in today’s Russia can serve as a point of
departure for the development of communism’.99 But Lenin rejected this
analysis in the 1890s as ‘economic Romanticism’, advocating capitalism
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instead as a necessary, albeit painful, step on the way to socialism.100 The
Communist party broadly followed Lenin’s line in aggressively promot-
ing industrial progress, but there was a medievalist strand in Russian
socialism for those who, for their own reasons, needed to ﬁnd it.
Joan Beauchamp, as I have demonstrated, was keen to show how the
Russian collective farm could outdo the American ranch in terms of
efﬁciency and output. But in a bizarre twist, she also wanted to see it as
a fulﬁlment of the dreams of Merrie England that had captivated English
socialists in the 1880s and 1890s. Describing a visit to a large sovkhoz
(state farm), she writes:
My train arrived at Ubokaya, a village which used to be in the Ukraine but
is now included in the Northern Caucasus, at 9.30 in the morning just in
time to catch a glimpse of a curious and interesting ceremony. The collec-
tive farms of the district had already gathered their harvest and were
bringing their grain to the railway. An avenue had been made of brilliant
red banners with such legends as ‘A Present to the Soviets from the
Collective Farms,’ ‘Socialised Grain for the People,’ ‘The Five Year Plan in
Four Years’ and other slogans. Down the avenue under the banners came
an endless procession of wagons each drawn by two bullocks, beautifully
garlanded and well groomed for the occasion. The wagons were piled high
with sacks of grain and attended by women and children in gay frocks and
festive decorations. Trains, alas, do not wait on ceremony, and I was
reluctantly forced to leave these village rejoicings, but I felt that at last I had
seen something not unlike the legendary ‘Harvest Homes’ of Merrie
England, which have now in my native Somersetshire dwindled into the
dull and formal Harvest Festival of the village church.101
This is extraordinary. On the one hand one could try to dismiss it as
another instance of a ‘useful idiot’ duped by a Potemkin display of
opulence along the lines of Orwell’s barrels of grain-topped sand. But
the image is so evocative – so powerful. Beauchamp is no longer trading
in the ofﬁcial utilitarian language of efﬁciency and output – this is the
Romantic rhetoric of Merrie England in full swing. The Russian coun-
tryside has become a kind of fantasy space where the contradictions
between Romantic socialism and utilitarian socialism, between Merrie
England and the Five-Year Plan, and between the cottage economy and
the collective farm can be resolved.
*
Where does this leave us? The opposition between Romantic and utili-
tarian socialism has become, partly as a result of the debates I have
described, a profoundly asymmetrical dialectic, where the language of
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politics (socialist included) is almost entirely utilitarian, and what is left
of the cottage economy ideal has been drained of political content. We
(and I suppose I should admit that this is a broadly middle-class ‘we’)
grudgingly accept the argument that intensive, industrialised farming is
necessary in a heavily urbanised society. But our behaviour – buying
organic, watching River Cottage, salivating over the increasingly sump-
tuous food porn that ﬁlls the weekend supplements – reaches towards
the cottage economy ideal as if to compensate for the grinding utilitari-
anism of political debate. The current media obsession with food speaks
to an interest in quality of which Merrie Englanders Cobbett, Belloc,
Chesterton and Orwell would have approved, even if they saw this as
part of a more properly political project. The true synthesis that Perry
Anderson found in Marx, and that Joan Beauchamp saw with her own
deluded eyes in the sovkhoz, seems an increasingly unlikely outcome.
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